Flood. 6 Flood, who eventually left office in disgrace, already was under investigation for corruption.
7
The FBI released information on three of Charles Medico's brothers, all deceased, but the agency refused to release Charles Medico's rap sheet on privacy grounds because he was still alive. 8 The reporter sued to gain access to the records, but the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the FBI's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the suit. The court held that the information was protected under the privacy provision of the FOIA's law enforcement exemption, 9 and that disclosure of the records would be an unwarranted invasion of Charles Medico's privacy.
10
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the CBS journalist and Reporters Committee. The appeals court reasoned that the government can not claim a privacy interest in an FBI compilation of law enforcement agency records when those same records would be available as public records from the individual agencies themselves.
11 6 See id. 7 See Laura Kiernan, Flood Is Placed on Year's Probation, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1980, at A8. 8 See 489 U.S. at 757. 9 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)7(C) (1994) . The exemption states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are "(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7(C) is one of two privacy exceptions to the FOIA. The other exception, Exemption 6, pertains to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." See id. § 552 (b)6. 10 See 489 U.S. at 757-59.
The Department of Justice appealed to the Supreme Court, which balanced the individual's right of privacy against the public interest in disclosure and reversed the appellate court ruling, thus allowing the FBI to withhold the information. 12 Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens said the FOIA's "central purpose is to ensure that the government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the government be so disclosed." 13 The Court reasoned that because a computerized compilation of an individual's rap sheet does not directly shed light on governmental performance, it falls "outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve. Say, for example, that a news organization sent reporters to courthouses and police stations around the country to retrieve public criminal-history records --arrests, convictions, and sentences.
The news organization could then computerize the information so reporters could enter a name and call up a profile of that individual's criminal history. Since all the information is admittedly public, such a private database would not invade anyone's privacy, at least not legally. 17 Id. at 764. 18 Id.
But when government does the same thing with its computers, according to the Court's ruling, an overarching concern for privacy suddenly sweeps away the public nature of the information and dramatically restricts the scope of the FOIA.
19
The restructuring of the FOIA in Reporters Committee through the lens of the "core purpose" test, coupled with the Court's creation of "practical obscurity," clearly demonstrates that the burden of proof in privacy-related cases now rests with the requester rather than with the government. Instead of a presumption of openness, there now exists a requirement that the requester show that the information sought will reveal --directly --something about governmental operations.
Where governmental operations intersect with the lives of citizens --and they do, daily, at the federal, state and local level --should individuals reasonably expect that those dealings will always be private? If so, then a prime purpose of the FOIA, the exposure of fraud, waste and abuse by government, has been tossed aside in favor a reflexive privacy right that seemingly has no end in sight.
Predictably enough, lower courts have faithfully followed the Reporters Committee doctrine, holding in a steadily growing line of cases that the "central purpose" When judges make a determination in a privacy-interests case under Exemption 7(C), the courts use a two-step test. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7(C). First, the documents must have been compiled for law enforcement reasons because this Exemption pertains only to investigative records. Second, the government must prove that the disclosure could "reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy." See id. Similarly, the courts use a similar test in deciding an Exemption 6 privacyinterests case. The courts first must determine if the records falls within the definition of "personnel," "medical" or "similar" files. See id. § 552(b)6. Second, the courts must balance the invasion of the individual's personal privacy against the public benefit that would result from disclosure. To withhold information, the government must show that the disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy." See id. See In all of these cases, courts after Reporters Committee have closely scrutinized public interest assertions. The federal courts narrowly define the "central purpose" of the FOIA as records that will shed light on agency performance directly. The analysis does not extend to the question of whether the records will facilitate reportage, and instead limits the public interest inquiry to the contents of the records themselves. Indeed, where documents have been sought largely for the personal information they contained, the courts have been protective of privacy interests unless the public interest is overriding. In fact, one federal court has said that the public interest argument is insubstantial unless the requester "puts forward compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity and shows that the information sought is necessary to confirm or refute that evidence." 24 The concept of "practical obscurity" as an interest mitigating toward privacy is seldom discussed in these post-Reporters Committee cases, but the notion certainly thrives within the "central purpose" doctrine. The cases present an overall picture of a federal judiciary actively reigning in citizen access to the information collected and compiled by government. The fact that much of that information is compiled, stored and disseminated through computer networks leads to the logical conclusion that the more government documents created electronically, the greater the "practical obscurity" of the because the requested information concerned the plaintiff's own commercial interests). See Beall, at 1273-80.
data. Despite the revolutionary ability of the computer, and of the Internet, to make information more readily available to the citizenry, "practical obscurity" stands ready to limit its vast potential to democratize information.
At the heart of "practical obscurity" is the Court's new categorical approach in cases involving privacy claims. To the Reporters Committee Court, information is either about individuals or about government; when the two categories blend, the result, in the Court's view, should almost always be non-disclosure. Neither life, nor data, is ever quite so simple. A more reasoned approach does exist, however, in a line of cases interpreting the Privacy Act, a statute closely related to the FOIA.
The Privacy Act Approach: When is a record "about" an individual?
Enacted in the wake of the Watergate scandal of 1974, the Privacy Act is an important yet little-known statute. 25 It represents a measured response by Congress to the public's concern that the federal government was gathering vast amounts of data about individuals and that the data might be in ways that threatened personal privacy. 26 The Privacy Act was designed as a protector of personal privacy against the potential government misuse of information. 27 The Act specified that its purpose was "to provide certain safeguards against an invasion of personal privacy," through the fulfillment of six guiding provisions. 28 As a statute aimed at protecting the right of the people to maintain some degree of control over information the government collects about them, it can be viewed as the legislative counter to the FOIA.
The Privacy Act of 1974 attempted to strike a delicate balance between the government's need to gather and to use personal information and the individual's competing interest in maintaining control over such personal information. Broadly stated, the Act requires every federal agency maintaining a record on an individual within a system of records to: (1) permit the individual to control the use and dissemination of information contained in the record; (2) permit the individual to review, to correct, or to amend information contained in the record; (3) regulate and restrict the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information in the record; and (4) be subject to civil suit for specified violations of the Privacy Act. 29 Collectively, these safeguards are designed to protect individual privacy, while preserving the government's ability to gather and to use personal information.
A key question under the Privacy Act, then, is what records are subject to the various provisions of the Act. The statute defines a "record" as follows:
…any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history, and that contains his 28 The provisions are as follows: 1. Individuals would be permitted to determine what records pertaining to themselves were collected, maintained, used or disseminated by federal agencies. 2. Individuals would be able to prevent records about themselves that an agency had obtained for one purpose from being used for another purpose without the person's prior consent. 3. Individuals could not only gain access to records an agency has on them, but could also have the information corrected or amended. 4. Agencies were required to make sure that information about individuals was current and accurate. 5. Agencies were exempted from the requirements of the Act "only in those cases where there is an important public policy need for such exemption" as specified in the Act. 6. Agencies would be subject to a lawsuit for any damages that occur as a result of willful or intentional acts which violate any person's rights under the Act. name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph. 30 Such a definition obviously has a broad sweep, applying not only to records containing a person's name, but also to any other document, regardless of physical form, that could be used to identify someone. In fact, the legislative language accompanying the compromise version of the Act upon its passage specified that the term "record" was defined so as "to assure that the intent that a record can include as little as one descriptive item about an individual." 31 As further evidence of the breadth of the term "record," the Office of Management and Budget, the agency with executive oversight of the Privacy Act, states in its Privacy Act Guidelines that the term means "any" item of information about an individual. 32 The OMB Guidelines point out that prohibitions on the on the disclosure of a record may apply not only to the entire record in its compiled state, but also to any item within that record set, provided that the record set contains an individual identifier. Tobey involved a computer system used by the National Labor Relations Board for tracking the progress of its cases. One of the fields in the system was for the initials of the field examiner assigned to each case. 36 Apparently, the board has traditionally used the system to prepare its annual report to Congress.
The plaintiff in Tobey worked for the NLRB as a field examiner. In connection with a grievance arbitration, an NLRB official conducted a search of the system using his initials to pull up his caseload, days worked and other information. 37 The plaintiff brought suit in district court against the NLRB under the Privacy Act, alleging that the NLRB maintained and used a system of records to retrieve personal information about him and disclosed that information to others without his consent. 38 The district court found that the NLRB had not met the notice requirements of the Privacy Act but concluded that the data retrieved were not "records" within the meaning of the Act. On appeal, Tobey argued that the district court improperly defined "record," and argued that the information disseminated by the NLRB was "about" him because it contained identifiers linking him to the information.
40
Rather than summarily conclude that any and all information that includes an individual identifier automatically meets the definition of "record" under the Act, the court instead turned to statutory text. 41 First, the records must be "about an individual"; second, they must contain an identifying number, symbol or other particular. 42 The court reasoned that the second requirement leads to an obvious conclusion about the first: the mere inclusion of an identifier does not mean that the information necessarily is "about" the individual. If it did, there would be no need for the first prong of the statute. Thus, the court concluded that in order to meet the statutory definition of "record," the information must include some identifying information that is "about" the individual. 43 This conclusion led the court toward a more substantive evaluation of the nature of the information.
To determine whether the information in the NLRB CHIPS system was "about" Tobey, the court examined the use of the data in question. Because the database was used to maintain status reports on NLRB cases rather than on individual employees, the court concluded that the database held no information about individuals sufficient to trigger Privacy Act protections. 44 Rather, they contained information such as case name, 40 Id. 41 Id.
42 Id. at 470-71. For the statutory language, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a) (5) (1998). 43 Id. at 471. 44 Id. at 471.
allegations made, the number of private-sector employees involved and the dates of hearings, settlements and dismissals. 45 Admittedly, the system also includes the number and initials of the field examiner assigned to the case, but the court reasoned that "this no more means the information is 'about' the individual than it means the information is 'about' the date on which the case is settled. 46 Thus, the court construed the Privacy Act protects information that is "about" an individual, not that which simply "identifies" an individual. The latter category is a broad one, encompassing virtually all data relating to an individual; the former, however, includes only information that "actually describes" the individual. 47 In other words, the mere possibility that NLRB officials could use data from CHIPS in combination with other information to draw inferences about his job performance did not transform the data into "records" protected by the Privacy Act.
48
Tobey has proven influential in shaping this area of Privacy Act law, but the federal courts still are mostly divided over the textual approach in determining when information becomes a "record" for purposes of the Act. 49 For example, in Bechhoefer v.
Department of Justice, 50 a citizen wrote to the Drug Enforcement Administration suggesting that individuals connected to a local sheriff's office were involved in narcotics trafficking.
A DEA agent sent the letter to the sheriff, and the author was charged with making false statements (a charge that was later dropped). 51 The author filed suit under the Privacy Act to sanction the release of the letter, but the trial court, relying on Tobey, concluded that the letter was not "about" the author, but about the suspected drug dealers. The Bechhoefer panel followed the third approach as most consistent with the statutory definition of "record," concluding that the Act contains no language suggesting that the information must reflect a "quality or characteristic" of the individual. 58 Since the letter at issue contained the plaintiff's name, address and other identifying information, it was deemed a "record" about him.
59
The conflict in approach between the federal circuit courts in defining "records"
under the Privacy Act merits further scrutiny, and could lead the United States Supreme
Court to settle the issue in a future case. Indeed, it is unclear whether future cases will be decided under one standard rather than another. Such an analysis appears counter to the analysis under the Privacy Act concerning whether a record is "about" an individual. Under the various approaches to this question in the Privacy Act cases, it is clear that personal information --particularly in the context 64 Id. 65 Id. Where the lines between personal and governmental information blur, there must be some judicial consideration given to the purpose of the FOIA, as defined by the Reporters Committee court: "that the government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the government be so disclosed." 67 The information at issue in McNamera clearly does not happen to be in the warehouse of the government. It exists because it is about the government's investigation and subsequent conviction of a renegade sheriff for a multimillion-dollar drug business.
Conclusion
The Reporters Committee "central purpose" test, as interpreted by the lower federal courts, creates the [perhaps] unintended consequence of forestalling any judicial analysis into whether the information sought is intended to further knowledge about governmental operations. Rather than require courts to engage in the hard work of determining whether information sought through FOIA is predominantly "about" government or predominantly "about" individuals, the Reporters Committee Court offers an either/or proposition. The result is a test that robs the FOIA of much of its impact by reflecting the Court's dubious assertion that where governments and individuals collide, privacy interests must always triumph. In fact, the opposite may be true, for where 67 See 489 U.S. at 774.
governments involve themselves directly in the lives of citizens, the societal interest in oversight might be at its greatest.
The approach of the Tobey court in interpreting the Privacy Act gives greater weight to public interest arguments and requires the judiciary to engage in the kind of intellectual heavy lifting necessary to resolve conflicts between access and privacy.
While the Privacy Act is not a perfect parallel to FOIA, it is in many ways a superior 
